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The future of professional work?  The rise of the ‘network form’ and 
the decline of discretion 
 
 
 
 
This article explores the implications of ‘networked’ and ‘flexible’ organisations for 
the work and skills of professionals.  Drawing on material from four different case 
studies it reviews work that is out-sourced (IT professionals and housing benefit 
caseworkers), work done by teachers contracted to a temporary employment agency 
and work done through an inter-firm network (chemical production workers).  In each 
of these cases work that was out-sourced was managed very differently to that which 
was undertaken in-house, with managerial monitoring replacing and reducing 
employees’ discretion.  New staff in these networks had fewer skills when hired and 
were given access to a narrower range of skills than their predecessors.  By contrast, 
the production staff employed on permanent contracts in the inter-firm network were 
given (and took) significant amounts of responsibility, with positive results for both 
their skills and the work processes.  Despite these results, out-sourcing and sub-
contracting are a far more common means of securing flexibility than organisational 
collaboration and the implications of this for skills is considered. 
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The future of professional work?  The rise of the ‘network form’ and the decline 
of discretion 
 
A recurrent theme in both research-based and ‘futurological’ accounts of corporate 
change is the decline of the vertically integrated bureaucratic firm and the 
corresponding rise of more flexible forms of organising work.  The names of these 
new organisational forms vary, as does the way each is organised, but the best known 
models include: ‘flexible firms’ (Atkinson, 1984), ‘shamrock organisations’ (Handy, 
1990), ‘network firms’ (Castells, 1996) ‘boundaryless organisations’ (Ashkenas et al., 
1995), ‘flexible specialisation’ (Piore and Sable, 1984) and ‘flexible capitalism’ 
(Sennett, 1998).  In these, temporary workers, contractors and inter-organisational 
alliances provide an effective extension of ‘core’ functions and staff.  The incidence 
and efficacy of these ‘networks’ has been the subject of considerable criticism (see 
Pollert, 1988; Rainnie, 1988 and Thompson and McHugh, 2002, among others).  
Whether the ‘network forms’ imagined by the more optimistic writers exist in practice 
or not, the last decade has witnessed a dramatic growth in both sub-contracting 
services and non-standard contracts for employees.  Indeed, according to the 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey some 90 per cent of organisations sub-
contract one or more services and about three-fifths use both contractors and one 
other form of non-standard labour (Cully et al., 1999:35). 
 
The form that much of this sub-contracting takes is prosaic with cleaners and cooks 
dominating the list of out-sourced services (Cully et al., 1999).  This has some 
worrying implications for skills.  It has become increasingly fashionable to 
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individualise responsibility for acquiring and maintaining skills; yet those people 
likely to be best informed about particular qualifications and most able to appreciate 
the advantages of education and certification are the ones who have already gained 
qualifications.  People engaged in unskilled work who possess few or no 
qualifications are less likely to be funded in training by their employers (Cully et al., 
1999), less likely to have information about qualifications, most likely to take 
qualifications with little or no rate of return (Bennett et al., 1992) and, as Rainbird et 
al. (this issue) show, may not be allowed to use their newly acquired skills in the 
workplace since the jobs that they are doing may be significantly de-skilled. 
 
The more optimistic accounts of network organisations counter these concerns with 
idealised images of professional workers for whom the move to contracting combines 
the best elements of organisational flexibility and individual freedom.  Handy (1990) 
describes liberated individuals enthusiastically developing their own skills in the 
intervals between enjoying time with their families and engaging in highly paid, 
interesting work.  While this is (at best) naïve it is not unreasonable to argue that 
people who are already highly skilled are far better placed to develop themselves in 
the absence of organisational support.  Indeed, Finegold’s (1999) analysis of the ‘high 
skills ecosystem’ that exists in Silicon Valley, California captures a group in which 
cutting edge tasks, the proximity of educational institutions and effective networking 
support the development of a highly mobile labour force. 
 
This article seeks to provide empirical evidence of the impact that different networked 
organisational forms have on skilled and professional workers.  It explores the 
influence that flexibility had on work processes in four different case studies.  The 
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workers studied are IT specialists, teachers, housing benefit caseworkers and 
production workers in a specialist chemical company, and this article’s focus is on the 
way individual skills were supported and developed.  Its conclusions are not 
comforting.  In every case, work that was out-sourced was more tightly codified and 
controlled than that undertaken in house.  As a result the discretion traditionally 
exercised by employees was (often heavily) circumscribed, skills were more rarely 
exercised and new staff had (or were assumed to have) fewer skills.  The only 
network that proved the exception to this rule was the specialist chemical company’s 
series of alliances with customers and suppliers.  Here, staff were employed on 
permanent contracts and the long-term relationships built up within the network of 
firms resulted in a very different form of co-operation than that which characterised 
the other networks.  The article concludes by considering the implications that each of 
these different forms of organising work has for skills. 
 
Research methods and methodology 
 
This paper draws on research funded by the ESRC’s Future of Work programme on 
Changing Organisational Forms and Organisational Performance under which work 
was conducted into eight case study companies over three years.  Around forty 
interviews and observations were conducted in each (often more for research on 
multiple sites).  Four cases, ‘TeacherTemp’, ‘FutureTech’, ‘Total Customer Services’ 
and ‘Scotchem’ are taken from this wider study for discussion here (the names of both 
case study companies and individual respondents have been fictionalised). 
TeacherTemp is a temporary employment agency that specialises in providing supply 
teachers for schools.  This is a rapidly growing market (DfEE, 2001; Forde and Slater, 
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2001) and TeacherTemp is one of the largest agencies.  It represents over 10,000 
teachers and support staff, providing more than 13,000 teacher days each week to 
some 15,000 schools.  This area of operations is both fast growing and extremely 
profitable.  TeacherTemp’s educational staffing business grew by 53 per cent in 2000 
and provides a disproportionately large share of its parent group’s profits. 
 
FutureTech has a ten-year contract with a Government department to provide 
computer services. The department is large and bureaucratic, employing 60,000 
people in more than thirty divisions. Its employees use some 40,000 computer-
terminals on a daily basis, which require both programming and maintenance.  
FutureTech is a large multinational software company that has experienced rapid 
growth in the USA and UK largely through out-sourced IT development and support.  
The UK division of FutureTech has grown from just a few hundred employees at the 
start of the 1980s to more than 20,000 today.  
 
Total Customer Services (TCS) specialises in business operations outsourcing.  With 
a turnover of over £200 million per year and more than 3,000 employees TCS is one 
of the largest players in this emerging market and has a strategy of rapid expansion.  It 
took over the management of the housing benefits office of a London borough as a 
loss-leader in order to break into an expanding area of outsourcing business.  This 
housing benefits office had previously been under performing and was identified as 
one of the worst boroughs in London.  Here, claim processing was out-sourced to 
improve the quality of service provided. 
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Scotchem, the last case study, is a pigment manufacturing plant. It is one of several 
UK based chemical production facilities owned by Multichem, a large European 
multinational that specialises in developing and producing industrial chemicals.  
Pigments have been produced on the site for over 75 years and Scotchem is 
Multichem’s centre of excellence in pigment manufacture.  The company employs 
over 650 people on its unionised site and produces around 24,000 tonnes of pigment.  
A regular feature of this production process is that Scotchem collaborates with 
customers and suppliers in order to develop both processes and products for specific 
orders (Marchington and Vincent, 2001). 
 
Each of these four networks is organised, and gains its flexibility, in a slightly 
different way.  In the first it is the individual supply teachers with whom 
TeacherTemp contracts.  The length of their contact with schools varies from as little 
as one day, to cover unexpected absence, to an entire academic year when a teacher is 
on maternity leave or suffers long term illness.  Supply teachers receive neither 
holiday nor sick pay and most earn only when they work, though some favoured 
temps are guaranteed work and paid around 55 per cent of their daily earnings when 
this is not available.  Essentially supply teachers provide schools with numerical 
flexibility. 
 
The council’s contract with TCS is rather more complicated.  Claim processing has 
been contracted out for seven years and initially contact between the two firms (with 
the exception of contract negotiation at senior level) took the form of council staff 
monitoring claims processed by TCS caseworkers.  However the original contract also 
set performance levels for TCS and these have not been met.  As a result the council 
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have set a new series of targets and weekly meetings are held with senior TCS staff to 
discuss performance. 
 
Contact between FutureTech and its government department is both regular and 
detailed.  Computing developments are notoriously difficult to predict and both 
parties were anxious to gain the benefits of increasing processing power during their 
contract term.  Equally, government work is regulated by policy and may change in 
response to national directives.  As a result, FutureTech and the government 
department were anxious to establish a ‘partnership’ rather than a tightly regulated 
contract.  Regular meetings are held at all levels, payments for work undertaken may 
be negotiated retrospectively and profits exceeding an agreed amount are to be shared 
between the two parties. 
 
But it is Scotchem, which has the most flexible network, at least in terms of its 
relations with customers and suppliers.  Since it produces chemicals in bulk and can 
both place and fill orders on a very large scale many of its suppliers and customers are 
long-term with twenty or thirty year relationships not uncommon.  Formal contracts 
tend to be short-term, with quarterly negotiations used to set prices and agree 
approximate levels of consumption in order to manage work in progress.  However, 
these agreements are part of very long-term relationships.  As a result, a series of 
alliances and friendships have built up between various staff members with informal 
contacts and tacit knowledge supplementing official agreements about co-operation.  
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Contracts, control and the decline of discretion 
 
In theory, outsourcing only changes the responsibility for completing a task, not the 
task itself.  In theory too, such a change may improve efficiency and effectiveness.  
The organisation that out-sources may gain numerical flexibility, hiring staff only 
when needed (as the schools do) or secure access to expertise that it lacks internally 
(as with TCS and FutureTech).  Yet these theories focus on organisational experience 
or expectations and assume that the way work is managed does not affect the way it is 
carried out.  In practice, in each of these networks, outsourcing required a change in 
management structure which fundamentally altered the work processes.  Such 
adjustments might have been predicted.  There are, broadly, two distinct ways of 
controlling staff, ‘status’, in which employees are trusted to perform often ill-
specified or ‘extra-functional’ activities (and through which they may gain certain 
rights) and ‘contract’ where tasks tend to be clearly specified and tightly controlled, 
completed at the order of employers (Streeck, 1987).  Most employment relationships 
tend to be a fluid mixture of both, influenced by organisational structures, individuals 
and contexts.  According to the prescriptive literature, liberation from bureaucratic 
control should increase an individual’s autonomy; in practice, in FutureTech, TCS 
and TeacherTemp, the reverse was the case.  Each of these three case studies moved 
from work being conducted in-house, by permanent staff who were often expected to 
participate in wider organisational activities, to contracting individual tasks to 
external suppliers.  In every instance the process of contracting meant that tasks were 
more strictly defined and monitored and employees were able to exercise less 
discretion. 
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In one case at least, the removal of the requirement to participate in wider 
organisational tasks was a key motivator for workers to stay on contract.  Many of the 
supply teachers we spoke to welcomed the opportunity to teach rather than participate 
in the paperwork and administration involved in running a school (Grimshaw et al, 
2001).  Most viewed this as liberation from an onerous burden, but the price generally 
paid was the loss of an opportunity to control what was taught.  Part of the paperwork 
that teachers are required to complete is lesson plans which include learning 
objectives and outcomes.  Supply teachers, unless on long term contracts, no longer 
have to write up lesson plans but, since lesson plans must both exist and be followed, 
they are required to conform to plans drawn up by others.  Since learning outcomes 
tend to be written in general terms they can be very difficult to interpret and, for 
many, much of the pleasure of class contact was lost. 
 
I thought I would have more freedom to [do] certain things.  I thought, I will be 
able to decide I am here for a day and we will do a project on that and at the end 
of the day we would have produced a book about so-and-so and they would go 
home thinking, right it has been a whole day with a different person who has 
been really nice to us because you can afford to be friendly with them and you 
decided what they are going to do and you have got their co-operation, they are 
excited about the topic and they go home with a piece of work that they have 
done and finished and you cannot do that.  So that is a bit disappointing. (Janet, 
supply teacher) 
 
In TCS and FutureTech the reduction in discretion had no positive consequences.  
Housing benefit staff had previously been responsible for seeing an entire claim 
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through from start to finish, ensuring that the documentation was complete and 
correct and often exercising their professional judgement to condone minor 
omissions.  Since forms were complicated and demanded repeated pieces of evidence 
these omissions were reasonably common.  Under TCS, once the work was contracted 
out, processing was re-organised so that caseworkers ‘specialised’ in one part of the 
claims process or worked in the newly set-up call centre for extended periods of time 
(instead of part of a shift, as had been the case under the local authority).  Housing 
benefit is a complex area and regulations are subject to change so this specialisation 
not only made processing claims less pleasurable by taking away caseworkers’ 
feelings of ‘ownership’ and making their work less interesting; it also meant that 
skills declined.  Staff were no longer aware of changes that occurred outside their own 
narrow remit.  Their power to make decisions was also lost.  Caseworkers were 
required only to ensure that the paperwork was complete before passing the form back 
to the local authority, rather than approving it as it stood. 
 
In theory, the ‘partnership’ between FutureTech and the government department had 
been designed to avoid such a narrowing of tasks.  This decision owed more to the 
desire to avoid a costly and public IT failure by being overly prescriptive about 
processes than to a wish to provide employees with interesting, skilled work.  
However, before the contract had been set up, FutureTech’s government department 
had conducted an audit of the tasks undertaken by their computing staff.  These 
extensive investigations attempted to codify the work done so that FutureTech knew 
what was required and the government department knew what it was contracting out.  
One consequence of this was that work, which had previously been discretionary 
(since few civil servants had expertise in IT), was now subject to active management. 
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Furthermore, whilst internally IT development staff had had relative freedom to 
pursue technological innovations and experiment with new software, FutureTech’s 
tight budgetary controls meant that, once out-sourced, software development was 
restricted to pre-tested technologies. 
 
To a certain extent, this decline in discretion was an inevitable part of the contracting 
process.  After all, tasks may be contracted out, but responsibility remains with the 
original organisation.  This institutional separation of execution and authority has 
implications for work processes.  While in-house staff might be controlled through 
trust, work undertaken by external bodies was regulated by ‘contract’ and the high 
levels of discretion that IT experts within the civil service had been allowed ceased 
once these same tasks were out-sourced to FutureTech.  For the local authority and 
each individual school, monitoring existed to meet government regulation as much as 
to ensure they were receiving the services contracted for.  Because school inspectors 
demand lesson plans, permanent staff were required to draw these up and supply 
teachers to follow them.  Because local authorities must validate claims, council staff 
checked every detail of every form before authorising it.  Permanent teachers’ work 
was intensified and the in-house experts retained by both the council and the 
government department found that the monitoring was as time-consuming and tedious 
for them as it was for the ex-colleagues they monitored.  The changes in organising 
work introduced by TCS were countered by this additional layer of control. 
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Changing skills, changing workers 
 
In all three case study companies the contracting out of work and the decline in 
employees’ discretion was matched by changes in personnel.  In FutureTech, part of 
this change was conscious.  The company had sought to keep many of the old civil 
service staff since it needed their knowledge of systems and procedures and 1,700 
were transferred over when it won the contract.  However, it also wished to reduce 
costs and a voluntary redundancy programme was set up which many of the more 
experienced staff took advantage of.  In addition to this, agreements with individual 
contractors were terminated when they came up for renewal (one of the major 
incentives behind out-sourcing work to FutureTech had been the desire to reduce the 
number of costly contractors).  In the hope of retaining many of the contractors’ skills, 
graduate trainees were instructed to ‘shadow’ them.  Even with the full co-operation 
and consent of the contractors it is unlikely that anyone could have made the 
transition from raw recruit to expert in the time available and the inexperienced 
graduates required considerably more direction than the contractors they replaced.  In 
FutureTech, just as the work itself was increasingly subject to monitoring so too did 
those employed increasingly require supervision and, after the audit, this supervision 
was managerial rather than professional.  Service targets were set for the first time 
and FutureTech was expected to meet them. 
 
Similarly, supply teachers often had little experience of the subject area or the age 
group that they were providing cover for.  For some, who had trained to teach senior 
school pupils but preferred younger children, this was an advantage.  For others, who 
wished to focus on their own area of expertise, it was less welcome.  In every case, 
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this lack of experience provided an additional reason for higher levels of managerial 
control. 
 
In TCS, as in FutureTech, the initial work group was of skilled staff who had 
transferred over from the local authority, but these were supplemented by agency staff 
(25 from a workforce of 110) whose levels of skill and experience varied.  Further, 
TCS itself hired and trained new recruits but these were less well qualified then the 
existing caseworkers and the training that they were given was greatly shortened. 
 
Such increasingly active management was more a product of the sub-contracting 
process than a reflection of changes in the skills base.  The audit systems were 
imposed on all workers and even the most experienced and skilled staff who had been 
accustomed to exercise discretion when working ‘in-house’ were subjected to higher 
levels of control as sub-contractors.  In these three case studies there was a reduction 
in the skills base that had existed prior to contracting out, but in each this reduction 
was a consequence, rather than a cause of, the increasing emphasis on audit.  This 
reduction in skills was partly because the temporary nature of the agreements 
provided fewer incentives for organisations to develop and maintain employees’ 
skills.  TCS, which had a seven-year contract with the council, introduced a 
caseworker training programme, but this equipped workers with fewer technical skills 
just as its re-designed work processes demanded fewer skills.  Supply teachers were 
almost never included in school development activities and there was little incentive 
to provide even individual feedback and coaching with schools responding to 
unsatisfactory performance simply by asking the agency to send some-one else next 
time.  In FutureTech, staff who were given training and development tended to move 
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away from the government agency contract (though the recession in the IT labour 
market has recently limited this). 
 
This reduction in employees’ discretion was almost universally frustrating for the 
workers concerned.  Supply teachers certainly took pleasure in not participating in the 
management of the schools they taught in but the lack of control over their classroom 
activities was not welcomed and both TCS caseworkers and some FutureTech 
computing staff disliked the detailed monitoring of their work.  At an aggregate level, 
outsourcing seems to inevitably increase the number and extent of managerial and 
audit systems since there must be proof that a contract’s terms have been complied 
with.  It seems that, contrary to the optimistic predictions of management 
futurologies, contracting out tasks reduces the skill and discretion that even able 
professionals can exercise as well as taking away institutional and individual 
incentives to train and develop. 
 
Scotchem and ‘learning networks’ 
 
Scotchem’s network was qualitatively different to the three described above.  Since it 
is one of the largest multinationals engaged in producing chemicals and pigments, 
several of its relationships with suppliers and customers were long term.  Specific 
contracts for services could be short, but they were repeated and inter-firm 
relationships could and did last twenty or thirty years.  Many of these companies were 
competitors but the size of their orders and the duration of the contacts meant that, 
here at least, market dependency resulted in the growth of trust.  Officially contact 
took the form of contracts for particular services, unofficially it came close to a 
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contract for service, allowing trust and status to develop.  Even the seven and ten year 
agreements held by TCS and FutureTech could not match this.  There, there was no 
guarantee that agreements would be renewed, inter-firm relationships revolved around 
monitoring and control, and performance measures tended to be short term. 
 
By contrast, in Scotchem, individual employees held permanent contracts and staff at 
all levels were expected to exercise responsibility and engage in ‘extra-functional’ 
activities.  When a new plant was set up one of the operatives commented that: 
 
We’ve been left with quite a free role to priorities ourselves, and sort our own 
team out, what we do and who does it, left to out own responsibility for that. . . 
. We know our responsibilities, we organise ourselves. I think the ownership 
has come from - because we understand the business and the needs of the 
business. 
 
These expectations were extended to work with other firms.  Orders for pigment 
would often involve developing products or improving delivery and, to achieve this, 
Scotchem employees at all levels were required to collaborate with customers and 
suppliers, a working arrangement which included shop floor employees who would 
test new processes and equipment before developments were finalised.  Two of the 
most recent results of such inter-organisational collaborations were a complex 
automated loading facility for part of the Scotchem site and larger and tougher bags 
for the powdered chemicals.  Extensive collaboration with one preferred supplier in 
producing bag specifications had maximised benefits for both parties by significantly 
reducing leakage which might foul the loading equipment. 
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Each of these collaborations was formally governed through contract and the 
information that could be revealed to competitors was restricted.  But the long-term 
relations between the firms and the friendships that often existed between employees 
meant that contracts were honoured more in breach than in observation.  Exchanges 
generally went beyond permitted limits and several people commented that projects 
would not have succeeded were it not for both sides’ generosity with information.  
Significantly too, contracts set out the aims of each collaboration and little attempt 
was made to specify or monitor detailed tasks. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Many of the enthusiastic predictions and prescriptions for organisational flexibility 
have seen little discrepancy between the move to networked firms and the rise of the 
‘knowledge worker’.  Yet, as three of the case study companies reviewed here 
demonstrate, the pursuit of flexibility may require forms of control that automatically 
reduce skill and discretion; and this is as true of professional and skilled workers as it 
is of the unskilled (Rainbird et al., this issue).  This has some worrying implications 
since sub-contracting and the use of temporary workers is a far more common means 
of securing flexibility than the sort of network described at Scotchem.  It should be 
noted (for we have no desire to replace one myth with another or suggest that 
Scotchem had access to a magic not shared by other firms) that it was also a form of 
flexibility that took place within Scotchem.  Here a number of low skilled tasks 
(including cleaning and security) were out-sourced on short term contracts and these 
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were monitored through tightly defined (and ever lengthening) audit lists to the 
frustration of the workers employed. 
 
It seems that the management and control of sub-contracted tasks is necessarily 
different to that of work completed internally and that this monitoring makes much of 
the work less pleasurable, less discretionary and more frustrating.  A conclusion that 
may explain part of the substantial reduction in discretion observed by Felstead et al. 
(2002) and Gaillie et al. (2002; though see also Power, 1997).  Nor does it seem likely 
that this increase in monitoring improved performance in our three case studies.  The 
council’s detailed supervision made benefit claims more time consuming than before 
and vulnerable claimants were often forced to wait for payment, while FutureTech 
staff complained repeatedly that the targets they were set did not fairly reflect either 
their capabilities or performance levels pre-transfer. 
 
More broadly, given the substantive increase in contracting, it would be better to 
appreciate the limitations that this form of networking may have than rely on 
enthusiastic predictions of increases in skill and freedom.  The increasing regulation 
that characterises these studies is simply a modern form of Taylorism with many of 
the disadvantages that this implies (Streeck, 1987; Doray, 1988).  Under these forms 
of work organisation, tasks are completed well only to the extent that they can be 
rigidly specified and policed.  Developing new processes and managing uncertainty, 
as the contrast between FutureTech and Scotchem shows, may be more effectively 
achieved under conditions of trust.  The implications for training and skill 
development are also worrying.  Britain has few intermediate organisations that 
effectively develop skills.  There are few collectives of employers to plan for 
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occupations (and fewer still where employers combine with either educationalists or 
the other parties to the employment relationship).  As a result, the onus of 
responsibility for developing skills (and sometimes designing training) falls on 
individual firms.  In contractual networks, this responsibility seems to diffuse among 
each member of the network with little incentive for any to accept it. 
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